tempted to use this theory for suits brought under cooperative federalism statutes.
In the past few years, a series of circuit court cases under the 1996 Telecommunications Act (Telecom Act)' established a new category of constructive waiver-which I shall call "regulation as waiver" -allowing Congress to render states amenable to suit in their role as regulators under cooperative federalism schemes. Under the theory advanced in these cases, Congress can obtain a constructive (as opposed to explicit) waiver from the states by granting them the gratuity of the opportunity to participate in regulatory activity that would otherwise be foreclosed to them by federal occupation of the field.' 0 In other words, states will be presumed to have constructively waived their sovereign immunity by agreeing to participate as regulators in cooperative federalism regulatory schemes, where the federal statute makes it clear that the state will be subject to suit in federal court for its actions as regulator. This is a positive doctrinal development from the policy-design perspective, as Congress can ensure when it invites the states to act alongside it as regulators that states are as accountable as the federal government for how they carry out that regulation.
The regulation as waiver theory's validity remains open to question in the federal courts. Although the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have accepted the theory," the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have rejected it.' 2 The Supreme Court agreed to address the theory's validity
US 666,675-87 (1999).
8 See Part I1.B (discussing implications of College Savings Bank on the constructive waiver doctrine). Now that the Supreme Court has given its blessing to Ex Parte Young suits under the Telecom Act, private litigants subject to the Act should generally be expected to proceed by that route. However, the regulation as waiver theory has potentially interesting implications for plaintiffs pursuing private litigation against the states under cooperative federalism statutes in general. While private plaintiffs may technically proceed under the Ex Parte Young theory, states are aggressively asserting various new exceptions to the doctrine, rendering whether Ex Parte Young creates an exception to state sovereign immunity in the context of a particular statute or for a particular plaintiff a focus of litigation in every one of these suits.
This Comment argues that regulation as waiver at once provides a viable alternative route for private litigation under cooperative federalism statutes, and comports well with current state sovereign immunity doctrine. Part I of this Comment introduces the cooperative federalism model, and the importance of private litigation to this model. Part II sketches out the limitations that the Supreme Court's current state sovereign immunity jurisprudence places on private litigation under cooperative federalism schemes, presents the regulation as waiver theory, and discusses how it has been received in the courts. Finally, Part III argues that regulation as waiver not only clearly fits within the bounds of the Court's constructive waiver doctrine, but also helps promote the larger goals of the federalism revival. Unless the scope of Congress's regulatory powers is curtailed more sharply than it has been, the reality will remain that Congress possesses and uses the ability to regulate almost every corner of American economic life. The cooperative federalism model carves out a significant role for the states in the regulation of many of those areas. Insofar as the availability of regulation as waiver preserves cooperative federalism as an attractive regulatory model for Congress, without violating the impera- tive that states give up their immunity voluntarily, advocates of a robust system of dual sovereignty should cheer.
I. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,' 4 when enacting regulation pursuant to any of its enumerated powers, Congress may completely displace state regulation and implement a purely federal regulatory scheme. However, in a variety of fields, it may see an advantage to regulating in partnership with local governments, and would therefore turn to the cooperative federalism model, carving out a role for state bodies in areas governed by preemptive federal regulation. Congress generally includes provisions authorizing private suit against state regulators in these statutes to ensure their enforcement.
A. Cooperative Federalism Statutes
As defined by the Supreme Court, cooperative federalism statutes are federal laws adopted pursuant to Congress's "authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause," that "offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."" Starting with the passage of several major environmental statutes" in the 1970s, Congress has "repeatedly endorsed the cooperative federalism strategy."' 7 More diverse cooperative federalism regulatory schemes include: Medicaid," the Occupational Safety and Health Act," the Public 14 US Const Art VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
15 (2000) . See 29 USC § 667(b) (giving states the option of preempting federal regulation if they "assume responsibility for development and enforcement" of occupational health and safety).
Utility Regulatory Policies Act," ' the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 2 ' and the Cable Communications Policy Act. 22 These statutes rely on local government bodies to design and implement local regulation according to national standards. The Clean Air Act, for example, sets national ambient air quality standards," but charges the states with achieving them through state implementation plans designed by the states and approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 24 The Telecom Act, which mandates that local telephone monopolies enter into interconnection agreements with would-be competitors," invests state commissions with primary responsibility for enforcing those interconnection agreements." By having the local government bodies implement federal regulation locally, these statutes preserve a role for the states in areas that the federal political branches have decided it is in the nation's best interest to regulate according to a central design.
B. The Role of Private Litigation in Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative federalism statutes generally provide private citizens with a right of action to sue both federal and state regulatory bodies responsible for their implementation. Congress's express purpose in making these provisions is to vindicate the rights of the regulated community that may be impinged upon in the course of regulation, and to make sure that the states hold up their end of the regulatory bargain. This mirrors the system through which the federal government makes itself accountable under purely federal regulatory schemes.
1. Rights-vindicating provisions.
As the growth of the administrative state brought more and more activity within the ambit of federal regulation, the federal government 
26
See generally id § 251. If private negotiation of an interconnection agreement fails, either party can petition the state commission that regulates local phone service to arbitrate. See id § 252(b)(1). Once an agreement is concluded-by either negotiation or arbitration-it must be submitted for approval to the state commission, which may reject the agreement if it does not comply with Section 251 of the Act. Id § 252(e)(1)-(2). made itself amenable to suit under the Administrative Procedure Act 27 and various individual regulatory statutes' to prevent federal regulators from abusing their powers at the regulated community's expense. " When Congress began to use the cooperative federalism model, it naturally provided causes of action in cooperative federalism statutes against both federal and state agencies. This ensures the same kind of accountability, regardless of whether a state or federal agency happened to be carrying out a certain portion of the federal regulation. The section of the Telecom Act governing interconnection agreements, for instance, provides that "in any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements" of the Act." 2. Citizen suit provisions.
Standing to sue under most federal regulatory statutes does not end with the regulated community. In the past thirty years, Congress has also included citizen suit provisions in a wide range of federal regulatory statutes, granting private citizens the right to sue administrators for failing to enforce the laws as Congress requires."' While there is some controversy about the efficacy of citizen suits in addressing the problem of federal agency inaction," the idea is that the threat 27 5 USC § 551 et seq (2000) . Section 10 of the Act, codified at 5 USC § § 701-06, provides for judicial review at the behest of parties that suffer legal wrong due to final agency action. The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."" 9 While the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not appear to immunize a state from suits brought by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Amendment broadly to mean that "an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state."" However, at the time Congress began using the cooperative federalism model, the Court's state sovereign immunity jurisprudence allowed Congress to render states amenable to suit in federal court, either by obtaining constructive waiver of their immunity" ' In College Savings, on a narrow reading, the Court ruled that Congress could not obtain constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity merely by specifying that actors-including state actorsparticipating in regulated activity would be subject to suit in federal court. Given some rather stern language in the opinion that casts aspersions on the concept of constructive waiver as an "end-run" around Seminole Tribe's abrogation ban, it is possible to read College Savings more broadly to write constructive waiver out of the law. But the College Savings opinion's acknowledgment of continuing circumstances under which the Court would still find constructive waiver belies any such intention. To the contrary, an examination of these exceptions yields a rule as to what sort of constructive waiver the Court will still allow. Specifically, it will allow a state to constructively waive its immunity by voluntarily accepting a gift or gratuity from the federal government where it is clear from the terms of that gift that, by doing so, it is subjecting itself to suit in federal court. The regulation as waiver theory fits within this rule.
A. Accepted Routes of Private Litigation under Cooperative Federalism Statutes after Seminole Tribe
Putting the availability of constructive waiver aside, the primary route for private litigation under the cooperative federalism statutes following Seminole Tribe is through Ex Parte Young actions for injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law. State sovereign immunity may also still be abrogated through con-44 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 59 (noting that the Court had previously found congressional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity only under the Fourteenth Amendment (in Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976)) and through its Article I powers (in Union Gas)); id at 66 ("Union Gas was wrongly decided and ... should be, and now is, overruled."). The Court maintained that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment because § 5 of the Amendment expressly provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," id at 59, and was "adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution." Id at 66. Thus, the Court stated, "the Fourteenth Amendment ... operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment." Id at 66-67. 45 Id at 72-73 ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States .... Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."). In recent years, the Supreme Court has redefined the calculus of federalism, tilting the scales more and more toward states' rights. This appeal represents an attempt by the named defendants-a complement of Massachusetts officials, including the governor, two cabinet officers, and the Commissioner of the Division of Medical Assistance -to capitalize upon that trend. As we explain below, they seek to push the envelope too far. 
B. Status of the Waiver Exception to State Sovereign Immunity
In College Savings, the Supreme Court noted that it had "long recognized that a State's sovereign immunity is 'a personal privilege which it may waive at its pleasure.' ' . Thus, it did not dispute the proposition that a state may explicitly waive its immunity to suit in federal court. But it overruled the main case, Parden v Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, ' that allowed a state to constructively waive its immunity in federal court-and in language casting great doubt on the continuing validity of the concept." And yet, the Court did acknowledge that in at least two situations it had allowed Congress to exchange a "gift or gratuity" for a waiver of immunity or other "action[] that Congress could not require them to take." ' 
US 184 (1964).
67 See, for example, College Savings, 527 US at 678 (noting, in a review of post-Parden case law, that "[tihe next year, we observed (in dictum) that there is 'no place' for the doctrine of constructive waiver in our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence"). See also id at 680 ("We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and we see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it.").
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Id at 686-87. evident tension between the Court's tone in overruling Parden and its reservation of the possibility of constructive waiver in certain circumstances has resulted in conflicting interpretations in the lower courts.
For the thirty-five years prior to College Savings, the Court allowed Congress to obtain a constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity where a state took part in a regulated activity. The leading case on this was Parden, where the Court found that, because Congress had clearly conditioned the exercise of the right to operate an interstate railroad upon amenability to suit in federal court, when a state exercised that right, it was "taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have consented to suit." 6 This stood for the proposition that constructive waiver occurred where (i) Congress clearly notified a state that it would render itself amenable to suit by engaging in a certain activity, and (ii) the state engaged in such activity.
College Savings, in which Florida was defending itself against a suit for false and misleading advertising under the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, expressly overruled Parden as out of synch with the rest of the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine." First, the Court said, it could not square Parden with its line of cases requiring that "a State's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal."' The Court wanted to be certain that a state in fact consented to suit, but found little reason to assume actual consent based upon "the State's mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation." 2 Presence in a regulated industry that a state is perfectly entitled to enter does not indicate any voluntary consent to suit, as the alternative would be the congressionally imposed sanction of being excluded from otherwise lawful activity. I take this to put the following stricture, at least, on constructive waiver: It must be certain that a state consents to suit; merely engaging in an otherwise permissible activity is insufficient to show this, because it lacks any indication of voluntariness.
Similarly, the Court reasoned that for Congress to "exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of Arti- It seems as if the Court's meaning here is that a state can never constructively "surrender its constitutional right[]" 7 to sovereign immunity-just as a con man cannot be deemed, minus explicit waiver through a plea bargain or otherwise, to have surrendered his right to a jury trial.
Yet, the Court went on to acknowledge that Congress could obtain constructive waiver in at least one instance. The Court noted that under Petty v Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission," 6 the Court allows Congress to obtain constructive waiver in return for congressional approval of interstate compacts." The Court also acknowledged that in cases such as South Dakota v Dole," it allows Congress to "condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions."'" While the "certain action" at issue in Dole was not a waiver, the Court's point was that Congress may ask the states to do something that it could not require them to do in exchange for the "gift" of federal funds." This, by it still allows in College Savings, it follows that a constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity may still be found where (i) Congress offers a "gift" or "gratuity" as seen in Dole or Petty in exchange for a state waiver of state sovereign immunity, (ii) the terms of the legislation make it clear that by accepting the gift or gratuity, the state in fact consents to suit, and (iii) acceptance of that gift or gratuity is truly voluntary. Voluntariness is the touchstone: Where the "inducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion,.' '' the offer of that inducement would be an unconstitutional condition, destroying the voluntariness of the waiver.'
C. Regulation as Waiver
Since College Savings, the Supreme Court has not approved any further instances of constructive waiver. Some circuit courts have begun to apply College Savings to find a voluntary waiver of state sovereign immunity in exchange for grants of federal funds. 7 However, several circuits have advanced a theory of regulation as waiver to uphold the private litigation provision of the 1996 Telecom Act, which, they believe, fits within the strictures of College Savings.
In two cases interpreting the citizen suit provision of the 1996 Telecom Act, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits argued that when a state takes up the opportunity to act as a regulator in a field from which it would otherwise be preempted by federal legislation, it is accepting a "gift or gratuity" for which Congress may obtain a constructive waiver of immunity after College Savings.' Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts."). 84 The argument in essence has two parts. First, because the Telecom Act includes provisions both offering the states the opportunity to participate in regulation of the local telecommunications market, and subjecting state regulators to suit for their regulation when the states accept the opportunity to regulate, when states enact regulations, they are indicating their willingness to be subject to suit. Second, Congress offered the states a valid "gratuity" in exchange for that waiver: Once Congress had decided to pass comprehensive telecommunications legislation, states could no longer regulate the industry unless Congress carved out a specific role for them. " The offer to the states of the opportunity to regulate is, therefore, a "gratuity," and states' acceptance of that offer voluntary.
The Third and Fifth Circuit have embraced the Seventh and Tenth Circuits' regulation as waiver theory. ' [W]e agree with the Tenth and Seventh Circuits' conclusion that, after College Savings, Congre!.,. may still obtain a non-verbal voluntary waiver of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, if the waiver can be inferred from the state's conduct in accepting a gratuity after being given clear and unambiguous statutory notice that it was conditioned on waiver of immunity.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that because "Congress pre-empted the states in the regulation of local telecommunications competition with regard to all matters addressed by the Act," the state defendant "waived its state immunity when it accepted the Congressional offer of a gratuity. As presented in Part II, regulation as waiver occurs when a state takes up the opportunity to act as a regulator in a field from which it would otherwise be preempted pursuant to federal legislation that also clearly subjects state regulators to suit. Regulation as waiver via the Telecom Act fits within the contours of the constructive waiver doctrine laid out in College Savings. This naturally extends to all cooperative federalism statutes that contain provisions authorizing private litigation against state regulators.
A. Regulation as Waiver and Current Constructive Waiver Doctrine
After College Savings, a constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity may still be found where (i) Congress offers a "gift" or "gratuity" in exchange for a state waiver of state sovereign immunity, 
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(ii) the terms of the legislation make it clear that by accepting the gift or gratuity, the state in fact consents to suit, and (iii) acceptance of that gift or gratuity is truly voluntary. As I will explain here, regulation as waiver in the context of the Telecom Act meets these requirements.
First, in the context of the Telecom Act, we must determine whether the opportunity to participate in a cooperative regulatory scheme can fairly be characterized as a "gratuity." In College Savings itself, the Court drew the line between a "gift or gratuity," for which Congress may obtain constructive waiver, and a "sanction,"" ' for which it may not. A sanction, typified by Parden, is the threat of exclusion from an otherwise lawful activity. A gift, exemplified by Dole, is the grant of money through the Spending Clause, which "Congress has no obligation to use ' "" , and which the state has the option to decline. A gratuity, exemplified by Petty, is a grant of consent to do something that states do not otherwise have permission to do." The "something" in Petty was the opportunity to participate in a bi-state commission, something that, under the Compacts Clause, the Constitution dictates that states may do only with Congress's permission."'
The opportunity to regulate offered under the Telecom Act looks much more like a gratuity than a sanction. Congress is not denying the states the opportunity to engage in otherwise lawful activity-that opportunity disappeared under preemption doctrine as soon as Congress occupied the field. Instead, it is offering them permission to participate in the regulation of local telecommunications, an offer that it has no obligation to make. Congress's grant of permission to the states to continue to regulate local telecommunications is therefore a gratuity within the meaning established in College Savings.
Second, to determine what constitutes a clear enough indication that, by accepting a gratuity, the state consents to suit, it is useful to again look to Petty. In Petty, a bi-state commission formed to build a bridge was deemed to have waived its state sovereign immunity'' through commencing to operate under the congressional document authorizing the compact through which it was formed. As explained by the Court in Petty:
The compact prepared by the two States and submitted to the Congress provided in Art. I, § § 1 and 2, that respondent should have the power to build a bridge and operate ferries across the 97 College Savings, 527 US at 687.
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Id at 686-87. 99 See id ("States cannot form an interstate compact without first obtaining the express consent of Congress; the granting of such consent is a gratuity.").
10M US Const Art I, § 10, cl 3 ("No State shall, without the consent of Congress,... enter into any agreement or compact with another State.").
101 The Court assumed the commission partook of state sovereign immunity.
Mississippi at specified points and in Art. I, § 3, that it should have the power "to contract, to sue and be sued in its own name.""' 2
In College Savings, the Court explained that in Petty, constructive waiver adhered "by reason of [the] suability provision attached to the congressional approval of the compact.""" In other words, that the compact simultaneously provided for the creation and suability of the commission was sufficient to create constructive waiver, even absent an explicit provision stating that, by commencing activity, the commission waived its immunity.
The 1996 Telecom Act has very similar provisions. Section 251 of the Act provides state commissions with primary responsibility for enforcing interconnection agreements. " Section 252 of the Act provides that "[in any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements [of the Act]." " ' Finally, we must look to see whether states' acceptance of the opportunity to regulate is truly voluntary, or whether the cost of turning down that opportunity is so great that the acceptance can only be deemed to be coerced. In College Savings, the Court cautioned that conditions attached to federal gratuities "might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion..' ' . This, the Court said, would be an unconstitutional condition, destroying the voluntariness of the waiver."" To get at whether an opportunity to act as a regulator in a preempted field is coercive, or something which states can be deemed to have accepted voluntarily, it is useful to look at the Court's prior opinions on federal coercion of the states.
In College Savings, the Court tells us that "the point of coercion is passed, and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed ... when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity. ' "" Thus, we know from College Savings itself, and its treatment of Parden, that the threat of exclusion from otherwise lawful, regulated activity, such as advertising services or running an interstate railroad, is coercive. This is not all that helpful, though, since the fact that the opportunity to participate in a regulated industry is not a gratuity itself defeats those exchanges. Turning to the cases the Court has upheld as involving voluntary exchanges, we know from Petty that the opportunity to participate in a bi-state commission at Congress's invitation is not a coercive inducement when offered in exchange for a waiver of state sovereign immunity. Further, we know from Dole, in which the Court upheld a statute granting the last 5 percent of federal highway funds to the states in exchange for an agreement to raise the drinking age to twenty-one, that such an inducement is not coercive. "" Applying this to the state sovereign immunity context, the Third Circuit held in 2002 that offering federal prison funds in exchange for a waiver of immunity was not coercive, because; "[t]hough this 'sacrifice' would doubtless result in some fiscal hardship-and possibly political consequences-it is a free and deliberate choice by the Commonwealth that does not rise to the level of an 'unconstitutional condition.'"''
In addition, the Court has explicitly differentiated the offer of an opportunity to regulate through cooperative federalism schemes from impermissible congressional coercion.' In Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc," 2 the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, under which the states regulate mining according to national standards, because:
[T]he States are not compelled to enforce the [federal] standards, to expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government. ' Similarly, in FERC v Mississippi,"' the Court upheld the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, which encouraged the states to develop programs dealing with the national energy crisis according to federal proposals, in part because, "if a State has no utilities commission, or sim-'H"' See Dole, 483 US at 211 ("[Because] all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact."). ply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals..... It follows that accepting the exchange offered in the Telecom Act is not past "the point of coercion" demarcated in College Savings. Under the Telecom Act, states can either regulate, or step out of the way and allow the federal government to regulate: Like other cooperative federalism statutes, the Telecom Act "allows a state to choose whether it will participate in the federal regulatory scheme.""6 If the state commission chooses not to act, the Federal Communications Commission will assume the state commission's responsibility for supervising the interconnection agreements." 7 While the choice to regulate may have certain definable benefits to the states-making sure that the regulation of the industry is tailored to local needs, for instance-that choice can hardly be called irresistible.
B. Potential Application of Regulation as Waiver to the Cooperative Federalism Model as a Whole
The regulation as waiver theory offered by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits potentially applies to all cooperative federalism statutes in which Congress has seen fit to include private litigation clauses. First, by definition, the opportunity to act as a regulator alongside the federal government is offered to the states in all cooperative federalism statutes as an alternative to being preempted. The Court itself defines cooperative federalism statutes as federal laws that "offer States the choice of regulating [certain] activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation."' ' . This means that the gratuity and unmistakability requirements are satisfied.
Echoing the argument made above in the context of the Telecom Act, the opportunity for states to regulate in fields that fall within the ambit of the federal government's enumerated powers is a gratuity once the federal government has decided to regulate in that area. The federal government is under no obligation to include states in regulation of those areas: States "exercise regulatory authority only by congressional grace."' ' .
Further, the mechanism by which this waiver is obtained is generally clear. Just as the proximate authorization and sue-or-be-sued clauses in the interstate compact in question in Petty were a suffi- tory program.'... Similarly, if states prefer to maintain their sovereign immunity rather than to regulate in a certain area that has been preempted by Congress, they may choose to have the federal government bear the risk of being subject to suit for misregulation.
C. Regulation as Waiver and the Policy Goals behind the Court's Federalism Doctrine
The regulation as waiver theory not only fits within the letter of constructive waiver doctrine as established by College Savings; it also serves the broader policy concerns of the "federalism revolution." By revitalizing the rights-vindication and citizen suit provisions of cooperative federalism statutes, it may help preserve that legislative structure-and with it, a strong role for the states in federal regulation-as an attractive option for members of Congress concerned with passing enforceable statutes.
Congress's goals in adopting the cooperative federalism model are remarkably similar to the Supreme Court's goals in advancing the current federalism revival. Once Congress has decided that federal legislation is needed, several main policy-design factors motivate Congress to adopt the cooperative federalism model in place of a unitary federal model. First, the cooperative federalism model allows Congress to "tailor federal regulatory programs to local conditions."' ' 7 Local regulators have unique knowledge of local conditions and therefore of the regulatory tools most effective for combating specific problems,'' which in turn allows them to avoid potentially welfarereducing, one-size-fits-all approaches. ' proaches that may assist in determining an optimal regulatory strategy.'.' Finally, this model allows Congress to leverage existing state bureaucracies, rather than expend resources on duplicate bureaucracies. ' The first three reasons that Congress is typically motivated to adopt cooperative federalism statutes match the reasons presented by the Court in Gregory v Ashcroft" ' for its efforts to protect "our federalism." According to the Court, our federalism (i) "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society";"' (ii) "makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"; ' and (iii) "allows for more innovation and experimentation in government.""'" Further, that cooperative federalism allows Congress to leverage existing state bureaucracies should also please federalism advocates, insofar as the alternative is to set up a federal presence in every state."
As discussed in Part I, when Congress invites the states to participate as a regulator alongside the federal executive branch through cooperative federalism statutes, it generally includes provisions that subject the states to suit. This constraint-one that Congress has thought necessary to impose upon federal agencies as well-is meant to protect the rights of the regulated community as well as ensure proper implementation of those statutes. But without either Ex Parte Young or some sort of constructive waiver theory, ensuring proper implementation becomes more difficult.
As To judge the importance of this, imagine if neither Ex Parte Young nor constructive waiver were available to private plaintiffs seeking redress under cooperative federalism statutes. The safeguards on the rights of the regulated community and the enforcement guarantees that Congress intended to provide would be considerably diminished. One might counter that the federal government retains the option of suing the states directly to assure that they properly enforce their portions of cooperative federalism statutes. But the executive branch does not have the resources to police state compliance with federal law. As Justice Souter noted in his dissent to Alden v Maine,"" "unless Congress plans a significant expansion of the National Government's litigating forces to provide a lawyer whenever private litigation is barred by today's decision and Seminole Tribe, the allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government [made by the majority] is probably not much more than whimsy.' 39 It is also conceivable that state regulators would be deterred from misregulation or failure to regulate by the knowledge that, should they fall down on the job, Congress could simply replace the cooperative federalism structure with unitary federal regulation, and thereby extinguish their role in regulation. But this does not provide adequate deterrence, for two reasons. First, it is hard to conceive that individual regulatory agencies would really feel that, should they misstep in carrying out the regulation as applied to their particular state, Congress would replace the entire statute. Second, and more saliently, the legislative inertia that must be overcome at the national level to pass a new statute makes this an insufficient check.
What happens, then, in this alternate universe? We can stipulate that where state regulation has been ineffective, Congress finds federal regulation to have a certain value.'"' It may, for instance, be 138 527 US 706 (1999).
139 Id at 810 (Souter dissenting). 140 The benefits that can accrue from federal regulation are familiar: It can serve a coordinating function. See, for example, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 301 et seq (2000) (preventing the misuse of facilities of interstate commerce in conveying to the consumer misbranded and adulterated food). It can solve collective action problems. In the environmental protection area, federal regulation prevents a "race to the bottom" among states that would otherwise be incentivized to relax controls below socially desirable levels to attract business. See Dwyer, 60 L & Contemp Probs at 224 (cited in note 119) ("Various failed efforts to get states to set and enforce air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the early 1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation."). Finally, it can break down local bar-needed to regulate trans-boundary problems, serve a coordinating function, solve a collective action problem, or break down local barriers to competition. We can further stipulate that, in light of the fact that Congress has included private litigation provisions in so many cooperative federalism and unitary federal statutes, it also finds enforceable, accountable regulation to have a certain value. So in those cases where Congress perceives the benefits of an enforceable federal regulation to be only worth the costs of regulating if the states are involved, Congress may choose not to regulate at all. But in those situations where Congress perceives the benefits of an enforceable federal regulation to be substantial enough to justify the costs of unitary federal regulation, Congress would instead choose to adopt the unitary model, displacing state regulators entirely. This result, in which the states are allowed to continue to regulate lesser affairs on their own, but are excluded entirely from the regulation of more critical affairs, is arguably perverse from the federalist perspective, insofar as it relegates states to a decidedly secondary role.
Perhaps some federalists would like this result. They might like a strong state sovereign immunity doctrine-one that forbids private litigation not only against state misconduct in regulated activity, which Seminole Tribe was clearly aimed at, but also against state misconduct as regulators-because it deters federal involvement in more "local" spheres. They might also like the fact that, by forcing Congress to act nationally (rather than cooperatively) in those spheres where the benefits of unitary action outweigh the costs, Congress, and not the states, will be accountable for how the scheme is carried out.
I would respond that the fact that Congress has passed these cooperative federalism statutes shows that it sees cooperative regulation as the best way to proceed in certain areas. By making Congress choose between unitary federal or state regulation, we would be forcing it to choose what is, by definition, a second-best solution. Further, there is nothing in our federalist model that envisions hermetically sealed spheres of authority between the federal government and the states. which the federal government acted through the states,"' as the Court has acknowledged, "under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government.' ' . 2 The fact just is that there is no longer a neat dividing line between areas of federal and state power. ' Given this reality, proponents of a robust federalism should prefer to see the federal government and state governments working side by side in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, rather than see the states excluded altogether.
CONCLUSION
In College Savings, the Supreme Court cast a skeptical eye on constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity. Yet, it concluded that in certain circumstances such waiver could still be found. A careful reading of the Court's language instructs that constructive waiver of state sovereign immunity may still be found where (i) Congress offers a gift or gratuity in exchange for a state waiver of state sovereign immunity; (ii) the terms of the legislation make it clear that by accepting the gift or gratuity, the state in fact consents to suit; and (iii) acceptance of that gift or gratuity is truly voluntary. The regulation as waiver theory, which should be available for most cooperative federalism statutes, fits within the letter of these requirements. Since this exchange is voluntary, regulation as waiver does not trench on states' rights any more than preemption itself.
Absent the availability of either the constructive waiver or Ex Parte Young theory, private litigation under cooperative federalism statutes would be constrained in such a way that arguably undermines the effectiveness of the cooperative federalism model. Given the role cooperative federalism carves out for states to participate in regulation of local activity in an era in which the federal government has the power to regulate almost all areas of American economic life, allowing a straightforward mechanism for private litigation under these statutes, and thereby shoring up their attractiveness and effectiveness, is something that proponents of a robust federalism should support. 141 The idea of having the federal government carry out its policies through the states was proposed in an early draft of what would become the "New Jersey Plan." See Max Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 616 (Yale 1911) ("The laws of the United States ought, as far as may be consistent with the common interests of the Union, to be carried into execution by the judiciary and executive officers of the respective states, wherein the execution thereof is required."). This plan was rejected, see id at 313, and the fact that a model in which the federal government operated through the states had been rejected was communicated prominently during the state ratifying conventions. See New York, 505 US at 165 (collecting examples).
142 Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455, 458 (1990) . 143 See note 137 and accompanying text.
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